Device-side component
The repository contains code intended to run on IoT devices. This exhibit represents devices as local data records.
A camera. A router. An unexpected connection.
Explore a fictional IoT incident from the network desk.
The plot records invented load values. It is not a prediction of real traffic.
The repository contains code intended to run on IoT devices. This exhibit represents devices as local data records.
The repository’s Go administration code reads terminal input and emits terminal escape sequences. This graphical fleet view is our design, not an authentic Mirai GUI.
The source separates device code, control services, and delivery components. Here the replay moves between predefined story states.
In this model, rebooting clears the observed compromise but leaves exposure unchanged. Closing management access and replacing weak credentials prevent the next scripted exposure event. These simplified rules are not remediation guarantees.
Advance to discovery, then observe the credential-risk and coordination phases. Select a device and isolate it to remove its contribution to synthetic load. Reboot without changing its exposure, then advance again to see the model’s reinfection condition. Compare with the hardened scenario. Reset starts a fresh notebook.
Repository reference ↗ · Original terminal interface source ↗
Browser-local simulation. No source compilation, credentials, scanning, packet generation, or live device control. All twelve devices and events are fictional.